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Article 5

ANALYZING PROPERTY ∗
IN DIFFERENT SOCIETIES
Jacques Vanderlinden†∗

INTRODUCTION
The distinction between persons and things is, for sure, one
which needs to be revisited; the diversity and quality of the
contributions to this workshop are ample evidence of it.
Furthermore, most of them, inspired by the reflections of their
authors and the eight questions so adequately proposed by the
initiators of this joint venture, are, quite naturally centered on law
systems which are familiar to teachers and students in European and
North American law schools. The ambit and purpose of this paper is
however quite different, as they leave the familiar shores of the
Roman-inspired legal traditions (I am exlusively referring here to the
distinction between persons and things) for those of the continent
celebrated by Joseph Conrad in Heart of Darkness. 1
The reference to Conrad’s work is particularly appropriate as the
following considerations deal with pre-colonial African laws, as
applied in societies which are indeed quite different from that in
which Gaius 2 established the summa division, which still rules a
good part of the formal apparent structure of many civil codes
throughout the world. But let us be quite clear: there is no such thing
as pre-colonial “African law.” The laws of Africa, even if one limits
oneself to so-called “ black” Africa–the one spreading from the
southern limit of the Sahara Desert to the Cape of Good Hope–reveal
∗

This written version differs substantially from my oral contribution to the
workshop; this is due to the fact–for which I apologize to the reader–that I am
unable to write a text before I speak on a specific topic. In a sense, to be true to the
title of the workshops, this is a “revisited” version of what I said.
†
Professor of Law Emeritus (Free University of Brussels, Belgium; and
University of Moncton, N.-B., Canada).
1. JOSEPH CONRAD, HEART OF DARKNESS, available at
http://etext.virginia.edu/toc/modeng/public/ConDark.html (last visited November
6, 2008).
2. Who taught law, by the way, in Africa, where the classical structure of the
digesta was less evident than in Rome.
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huge differences between the laws of people practicing agriculture,
commerce, fishing, gathering, hunting, and pasturing (if one looks
only at their mode of economic production) or having adopted
various types of socio-political systems (from the extended family to
one form or another of pre-state political regime) as their mode of
government. Such diversity precludes any serious generalization,
even on a regional or sub-regional basis. It is often said that most
lawyers (or legal anthropologists) who present the legal system of an
African ethnic group necessarily limit themselves to one group (or
possibly two) in the course of their academic career. There must
accordingly be no surprise if I shall essentially limit myself to one
African society, that of the Zande of North-Eastern Congo, even if
what I say or write could possibly apply to the members of the same
group who live in the the neighbouring Central African Republic or
the Sudan; this is a classical example of the splitting of African precolonial societies as a result of colonialism. What is essential is that
I do not pretend that my case study is valid for the whole of the
continent.
Nearly fifty years ago, when I arrived in the Zande country, I had
just completed my first year of teaching as a part-time “assistant”
(tutor) in the Faculty of Law at Brussels Free University from which
I had graduated in 1956 before serving for eighteen months as a
candidate reserve officer in the Belgian Air Force ground units that
specialized in the defense of airfields against possible paratroopers
from Eastern Europe! The people of whom I was instructed to study
the system of land tenure were as unknown to me as the heart of
Africa was to Joseph Conrad seventy years before, when he landed
on the shores of the Congo river. The only advantage I had on the
famous novelist was that there was some literature about Zande land
tenure. But I was clearly paid to go beyond it, as it appeared
unsatisfactory both quantitatively and qualitatively. I accordingly
spent six months in the field talking through an interpreter with
many Zande chiefs or simple peasants about what their legal
connection to land could be.
When doing this, I clearly was a foreigner approaching an
African society from the outside-in on the basis of what he had
learned, some years before, in a classical positivist law school about
“ things” or rather, more generally, about property (les biens) in the
Belgian (which is the French) Civil Code. At that stage of my
career, no need to say I had few (if any) qualms about what “law”
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was. I also knew that African laws were essentially “customary,” as
they were, mutatis mutandis, in the Northern part of France in the
Middle Ages, before the writing down of the customs as of the 15th
century onwards; this topic was precisely the one I was currently
discussing with my students during my tutorials. 3 Beyond that
sketchy and inapropriate background, I had read some contemporary
classics on structuralism by Claude Lévi-Strauss and bought a copy
of the Notes and Queries in Anthropology published by the Royal
Anthropological Institute in London. 4 All this does not plead very
much in favour of those who were sending me in the context of an
interdisciplinary mission entrusted with the task of advising the
Belgian governement about the economic and social development of
the Zande country.
In so far as I am concerned it nevertheless was a shattering
experience on two counts: at first, it deeply transformed me from a
legal point of view; second, it made me aware of the importance of
linguistics in the study of laws. Both had to deal with what I had
decided, many years before, my professional life would be: that of a
teacher. Until then, the law was to me an abstraction with a
universal value of which I had tried to master the intricacies in order
to pass examinations and get a piece of paper which would open
doors to a comfortable future. I had been exposed to some limited
aspects of its relativity through an introductory three credits course
devoted to the common law, but that was all. Furthermore that
course was taught in French with an occasional mention of English
terminology whenever it was indispensable to distinguish concepts.
But that was all. No fundamentals as to what a legal system or the
limits of translation were ever challenged. My first contact with a
single African legal system on a very narrow point–the law of
immovable property– irremediably changed all that.
I. IS THERE A NAME FOR PROPERTY?
My contribution to a better knowledge of the Zande world was to
present a clear view of the local land tenure system. These last three
3. See Jacques Vanderlinden, The Recording of Customary Law in France
during the XVth and XVIth Centuries and the Recording of African Customary
Law, JOURNAL OF AFRICAN LAW 165-175 (1959).
4. NOTES AND QUERIES ON ANTHROPOLOGY (Royal Anthropological Institute
of Great Britain and Ireland, 6th ed. 1951).
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words obviously sound more anthropological than legal, the latter
adjective referring normally to something quite familiar to lawyers in
systems where the law has a well-defined meaning. As the Zande
apparently had no distinct word in their vocabulary to identify law,
there was no use to ask them what their law about immovable
property was.
Yet they had courts and, interestingly enough, I met a case where
a distinction was made between two ways of solving conflicts
between individuals. The problem involved a husband and his wife.
She was the plaintiff and she was denied any remedy. The problem
she brought in front of the court was not considered because, the
judges said, it was not one of those within their jurisdiction. 5 It
rather fell within the jurisdiction of the parents of both parties who
had to sort it out between themselves. Would that provide us with a
distinction between what is legal and what is anthropological? Or
would it be only be an aspect of the legal pluralism existing within
Zande society? According to a positivist lawyer’s view, perhaps,
but certainly not for the Zande people involved. In fact, the
American or European lawyer is irresistibly tempted to project onto
African society his own conception of law. By doing so, he looks at
local society from the outside-in and the validity of such approach is
quite debatable.
Whatever the result of a possible debate may be, I chose to adopt
that approach and to have a good look at local cases as reported in
the native courts archives. I perused 2,000 of them in the course on
long evenings next to an oil-lamp roaring beside me, found out that
some 500 had to deal with private law and, finally, that there was not
a single case dealing with land tenure (not to speak of anything like
immovable property). At that stage, I could either give up and go
back to Europe or decide to take the anthropological path and inquire
through field work and interviews with inhabitants of the Zande
country. I chose the second possibility. Thus while carrying on with
the analysis of my 2,000 cases which allowed me to publish my
book, the Coutumier, jurisprudence et doctrine du droit zande, 6 I
turned myself into a legal anthropologist during daytime, visiting
5. A lawyer trained in Roman law–but many others too–would immediately
think of the maxim de minimis non curat prator. But beware of such too easy
comparison!
6. JACQUES VANDERLINDEN, COUTUMIER, JURISPRUDENCE ET DOCTRINE DU
DROIT ZANDE 350 (Editions de l'Institut de Sociologie 1969).
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farmers day after day, walking with them through their fields, sitting
in their habitat and trying to find what their answer was when
questioned on the basis of the Notes and Queries in Anthropology,
and also of some supplementary questions of my own.
Some conclusions resulted from that fieldwork. Here they are:
1. Each Zande socio-political unit–let us give it the name the
Belgian colonial authorities gave it, that is, chiefdom–occupied a
specific area of land. This area had a specific name in paZande (the
language of the Zande): sende. Anyone could settle on a sende,
provided he got the authorization to do so from the local authority–
let us again give him the name the Belgian colonial authorities gave
it, that is, chief. Normally, no chief would ever refuse a candidate,
as the more people that lived within his jurisdiction the more
powerful he was and was considered a “big” chief. Once he had
admitted someone on the sende, the chief would help him to find a
suitable place where he could settle down and establish his kporo;
there was no question of the chief imposing a place on his new
subject.
2. Land in the Zande country was plentiful, of an average-poor
quality, agricultural techniques were rudimentary, and manuring
practically non-existant as cattle could not resist the tse-tse fly.
Everyone could find a plot on which to establish his kporo. This was
the place where he would build his house, open up a garden of
various plants, organize his kitchen area, rest during daytime
between his activities, meet whith his family and visitors, etc. Not
too far from the kporo, he would clear, within the limits of his
physical strength, the öti or cleared land on which he would start
further work in order to open a bino on which he would grow the
main crop providing him with the basis of his subsistence and that of
his family. The products of that subsistence agricultural economy
were supplemented by the produce of the family garden and hunting
(often practised with some neighbours in order to facilitate it). Part
of these products went to the chief who would redistribute it on
specific occasions, such as holding a court to solve litigation
between his subjects. Finally, as this subsistence economy may be
considered to be a fairly rudimentary one, land had to be left resting
regularly between crops and, accordingly, the bino regularly lied
fallow for some time.
3. Such a factual description leads to one conclusion: as
everyone lives in that way, including the chief, who has his own
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kporo as a center of his personal life, land, as far as one could judge,
never was an object of any special interest, and accordingly an object
for any litigation, being altogether admitted that there could always
be exceptions justifying the rule, but also that I did not meet any
sample of it, either during my fieldwork or in the existing literature.
A second conclusion is that the social intercourse between persons
about land appears, until now, practically (but for the necessity for
anyone wishing to settle on the sende to be authorized to do so by
the chief) void of any element a lawyer would call property law, or
an anthropologist, land tenure. In order to bring legal notions into
the picture, one needs to look at what are the powers (or privileges)
related to the different categories of land and exercised by the people
described in the previous paragraphs. Hence, the interviews brought
me into the system as perceived by those living in it and not anymore
by the outsider.
4. In that perspective, let’s consider first the sende. Its limits are
determined by the chief and the chief alone. He is also the only one
able to decide that the sende will be abandoned by the group
(thereby relinquishing all powers on it) if there is a need for the
group to migrate. As long as the group is established on the sende,
the chief has, besides his exclusive power to admit newcomers on it
(see par. 1), full control over its parts where his subjects have not
established their kporo, öti or bino. But they, in turn, have on that
part of the sende the complete power to freely circulate on it, to
modify the place of their kporo, their öti or their bino, to collect the
wood they need to build their houses or to make fire, to hunt; in
short, take advantage of the sende as they please for their own use
and that of their family as long as it does not infringe on another
person’s situation. In a sense, the parties involved try constantly to
achieve equilibrium between whatever the chief wishes to do with
some parts of the sende and the limits of whatever his subjects want
to use it for. This is the reflection of a wish for consensus between
rulers and the people they rule. Being a “good” chief requires the
preservation of such reciprocal harmonious behaviour. The powers
of the chief vis-à-vis the sende is expressed in a word, ira, which
qualifies the chief. And the same word applies to his powers over
the people living on the sende. He is accordingly ira sende and ira
Azande.
5. If the chief has theoretically extensive powers on the sende,
the same is true of the individual established on it for any part he
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considers to be his. He alone begins with the determination of the
limits of his kporo, his öti or his bino, decides who is allowed to
circulate on them, what he is going to build or plant on his öti, and
ultimaltely, possibly, will make up his mind to abandon them and let
them turn back to the sende from which they had been taken through
his actions. Powers as to land in the Zande country are indeed
acquired by the individual through the incoporation of his work on a
part of the sende. The latter could be considered, when looked at
from the outside, as “virgin” land; that is, land which has not yet
been transformed by man’s actions; the three elements (kporo, bino
and öti) 7 we have been referring to could be called “transformed”
land, and, apparently, in order to qualify collectively these various
species of transformation of the sende, there is no generic word in
the local language which could be opposed to the latter.
Furthermore–and this is where the real rub appears, as in Hamlet’s
perception of sleep–we quickly realize that the individual is also
called ira kporo, ira bino or ira öti, the same word used for the chief
vis-à-vis the sende and the Zande. But this is a problem for part two
of this paper. Finally, the fruits which any Zande may hope to
extract from the land through the incorporation of his work on it will
definitely be his, to share with a possible family.
6. Looking at what has just been described in the
anthropologist’s way with a lawyer’s eye, one immediately enters
slippery ground. One indeed quickly tends to recognize, even if a
more detailed approach could lead to distinctions, two of the
classical components of the classical Roman concept of ownership:
the usage (usus) and the fruits (fructus), being absolutely clear that
the Zande language has no special general term regrouping the
components of the two notions. So far, so good. But then
immediately arises one of the most debatable, if not challengeable,
assumptions about pre-colonial African land tenure: the absence in
African systems of land tenure of an individual power of disposing
of land, the latter being necessarily common to the group and not
within reach of the individual. Let us try to have a look at the
various aspects of what the Roman concept of abusus may
encompass, and distinguish between different ways of disposing
from one’s land.
Abusus involves three coupled distinctions:
7. These three are but examples of a wide variety of specific lands coming out
of the sende through work.
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a) Alienation inter vivos or mortis causa;
b) Gratuitous alienation or alienation against compensation;
c) Alienation for the benefit of a member of the social group or for a
stranger.
7. Let’s consider the three above-mentioned distinctions:
a) Alienation inter vivos is the only one which can be contemplated
as, in the case where a head of family dies, his death is generally
attributed to bad fortune, the latter being necessarily associated to the
place where he lived. There is thus no question that someone would
stay (this is the case for whoever we would be tempted to consider as
his heirs) or come and settle down in such place as he would be
likely to be the victim of the same malediction. This, of course, is
the matter as seen by the Zande, and it would be preposterous to try
and invoke the absence of a “rational” link between the fact of the
death and that of the place where the kporo is established. Exit
alienation mortis causa. When talking to Zande peasants of the idea
of disposing of their land inter vivos, it simply does not seem to ever
have come to their mind. Why? This question brings us to the two
ways through which alienation can take place.
b) Gratuitous alienation or alienation against compensation?
Alienation of land against compensation is unimaginable, as who
would have a piece of cultivated land available to dispose of when it
constitutes the very basis of its subsistence and that of his family?
And who would be in a position to dispose of extra land in a system
where basic conditions–as described previously–for an extra
investment are not met? There simply is no market for land in the
Zande country. As for gratuitous alienation, it is even less likely–
and for the same reasons–than onerous alienation. And there is no
reason to necessarily include a power of abusus other than the one–
which we have already met–of disposing of the land by abandoning
it and letting the kporo, the bino or th ötis return to the sende from
which they originated as distinctive sorts of land through the
incorporation of man’s labour. But is any man roaming through the
Zande country free to settle down and transform the sende into a
kporo, bino or öti? This last question opens up a last problem.
c) Alienation for the benefit of a member of the social group or for a
stranger? The matter of alienation of land is already settled through
the previous paragraphs; it only exists when the ira of a kporo, a
bino or an öti decides to abandon a piece of land and lets it return to
the sende. Could then any Zande (or non member of that ethnic
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group) incorporate his work into the sende? By doing so, would he
become an ira of whatever piece of it he has so transformed? This is
a last point which is fundamental in trying to understand African
land tenure. And the answer of the Zande system on that point is
without ambiguity: as the careful reader has certainly already
noticed, when going through paragraph 1, only members of the
social group, i.e. persons allowed to do so by the chief who accepts
them as members of the group–and consequently disvest them of
their quality of stranger–are legally able to incorporate their work
into the sende and become (as the chief is in relation to the sende and
the Zande) an ira of their kporo, bino or öti. The affiliation to the
group living on a specific sende is, in the Zande case, purely
“political,” if one adopts a foreign classification which distinguishes
between, for example, cultural, economic, political, or social
affiliations; such a classification, there is no need to say, does not
exist in the Zande way of thinking about such affiliation. In other
African societies, the required affiliation will be, quite often, of a socalled “social” nature when the link results from consanguinity, even
if one considers the quite extensive one uniting members of the same
clan; in such case, the possibility of acquiring rights to land is
limited to members of the clan, which includes even those who,
being originally strangers, enter it by a ceremony of adoption. From
this importance of a necessary existing link between people holding
rights to land results the idea that African land tenure is “collective”
or, better, “communal.”
8. On the basis of what has been shown in the Zande example–
of which I am willing to admit that it could be atypical, but not that it
does not lead to a reassessment of our thinking about African land
tenure–the outside non-African observer is often led to a double
conclusion. When he adds the fact that there rarely is a factual
interest in disposing of the land, even for the benefit of a member of
the group, his inescapable twofold conclusion is a) that there is
nothing like ownership in Africa because of the lack of abusus, and
b) African land tenure is necessarily communal (collective has been
abandoned because of the confusion arising easily with the collective
conception of land tenure existing in socialist legal systems).
9. My personal point of view–which, I insist, is highly
debatable–is that as long as abusus exists and people can
individually divest themselves of their powers in connecton to land
under some form–in the Zande case by abandoning the land on
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which they have all the powers recognized to an ira–there is no
justification not to speak of an ownership of land in the Roman way,
provided–but this is never challenged–usus and fructus also exist.
No one has ever said that alienation must be either inter vivos or
mortis causa or gratuitous or onerous, in fact for the benefit of a
third party, which is not the case when a Zande abandons the land in
which he undoubtedly has well defined interests.
10. As for the communal character, no one seems to have ever
expressed the opinion that individual ownership disappeared when
the transfer of ownership to strangers was either curtailed or
excluded. The example–for many years–of Finland and Switzerland
are very clear on that point. During a long period of my life, I spent
my summer vacations in a sauna on a peninsula at the end of an
island fifty or so miles from Helsinki. I owned the cabin in which
we found shelter during these memorable weeks, but, as a Belgian
citizen, I could not constitutionally own the land around it. Would I
or anyone, including local lawyers, have said that the friend–a Finn
of course–who owned it, was not the owner of that land or that the
cluster of rights and duties he had in relation to it were not
ownership in the full sense of the word? Certainly not from the
Finnish point of view. And when, in winter, I once contemplated–
but, unfortunately never got the means to do so–buying a small
chalet in the Swiss Alps and was told that, as a foreigner, I could not
own that piece of immovable property, could I conclude that the
Swiss owner of the chalet was not an owner according to the relevant
provisions of the Swiss Civil Code? Of course not. Like his Finn
counterpart (but in a more specific way as such limitation in
Switzerland was essentially local and not general as in Finland), he
was an owner. Perhaps a slightly different one than his counterpart
in Belgium or Louisana, but still an owner. This being admitted,
would one dare to say that the Zande ira is an “owner”?
II. IS TRANSLATION POSSIBLE?
The last word of the previous section brings me to my second
section. But before considering some problems involved in the
linguistic transfer of African legal concepts in Western European
languages and the amount of doubts and dissatisfaction the exercise
leaves in the mind, there seems to be one point on which most
people interested in the matter seem to agree. What is more, it is
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directly relevant to the thread which unites the contributions to this
workshop, even if it is quite different from the ones usually
considered. It is, of course, a creation of American or European
minds observing African reality and creating abstract categories
which do not necessarily exist in African minds or languages. It is
the concept of the person-thing entity or unit.
Many anthropologists observing African land tenure have come
to the conclusion that land tenure does not deal so much with
relations between persons about land, but concerns rather the
analysis of the single entity that man has with earth or–why not?–the
latter has with the former. The one does not exist without the other
and, in that respect, one might say that African legal geography
(etymologically writing about the earth) is necessarily physio-human
geography and not purely physical geography. Or, as some are
inclined to say, “man does not own the land, the latter owns him.” 8
If we now look at the components of that entity or unit, the
person is not considered as an abstraction but as a diversity of human
beings occupying in society a specific position because of their age,
their sex or their cultural, economic, political or social function. The
same is true–as it was underscored in the previous paragraphs–for
what we call “land,” which is never considered in such abstract way,
but always linked to a specific function. 9 Thus a correct analysis of
land tenure necessarily goes through a previous careful analysis of
both components of it. And ends up with a presentation of a cluster
of person-thing unit which is not necessarily systematically
organized in societies where the need for abastract systematization is
not as felt as in ours. Quite obviously, my own analysis of Zande
land tenure was, from that point of view, totally unsatisfactory.
The immediate temptation, as the sudent of African law I was
nearly fifty years ago in the Zande country and the teacher I also was
(by the way, both I still believe I am) as soon as I came back from
Africa to my class in Brussels, was to communicate. Studying in
order to teach was already the fundamental activity of my craft. I
had not too many problems with the factual realities represented by
8. Quoted, without reference, in Daniel Biebuyck, Introduction, in AFRICAN
AGRARIAN SYSTEMS 2 (Daniel Biebuyck ed., International African Institute 1963).
9. One of the most interesting analysis from that point of view is that of G.
WAGNER, THE BANTU OF NORTH KAVIRONDO (Oxford University Press for the
International African Institute 1956) where he distinguishes 24 sorts of land with
reference to its use, 5 with reference to the rights of control upon them and 7 with
reference to its quality in Logoli vocabulary, but no term for “land” in the abstract.

72

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 1

the paZande words öti, kporo, bino or sende. I rather easily decided
that the first one would be “cleared land,” i.e., the part of land of
which all obstacles had been removed in order to possibly sow and
cultivate some vegetation on it; the second one, “habitat,” i.e. the
part of land upon which a house and his separated and aerated
kitchen would be built, plus whatever land was freed and prepared
for circulation around the house and the kitchen to receive guests, or
for any other use; the third one, “field” as it had to be sown and
tended on the bino in order to produce some crop; and, last but not
least, sende. With the latter, things appeared more difficult indeed. I
did not favour territory, as the latter has, in French legal language, a
specific technical meaning “linked with public law” (a non-existent
notion in Zande thought), which, if used to sum up the Zande reality,
was conducive to serious potential confusions.
In that respect, it was true that “territoire” had a less specific and
technical meaning in French when speaking of the territory of
animals. But, for obscure reasons, that reference when speaking of
people discouraged me from using the word. Re-reading my text of
1960 (the year of its publication), it appears that I did not venture in
a translation and satisfied myself with a description of approximately
twenty lines of what the sende was. Would I dare to propose today
the “physical support of social life,” which is far from short and
elegant? And also quite abstract, when compared to the formulation
of Wagner, “bush land that has never been cultivated” 10 for ovulimu
in the Logoli language, which seems to be the nearest to the Zande
sende.
But this was not the end of my qualms. The real test came with
the three letters of ira, either when we apply it to the individual or
when it concerns the chief. In fact, at a first stage, the problem was
not so much with the ira kporo, bino or öti. In accordance with the
conclusions I came to in paragraph 10 above, “owner” could seem
provisionally acceptable to me, provided one admitted (this still does
not fully satisfy me, as we shall see later) that ownership never is as
absolute as one likes it to be and that the Finns or the Swiss may–
with some approximation–be called owners as much as the Belgians
or the Louisianians. We would then have no problem in calling the
Zande commoner an owner, something of which Allott would totally
disapprove when he writes that “the words ‘own’ and ‘ownership’
are . . . misleading, for the description of African property
10. Id. at 76.
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systems.” 11 And he is indeed quite right. But then–in order to carry
his logic on a wider geographical space–I would consider that
ownership is as much misleading when comparing Finnish or Swiss
law with either English or French law, as both of the latter have no
restriction whatsoever linked to the nationality of the buyer of a
piece of land in England or France. Good enough. But, then, how do
I translate ira when referring to the individual? May I beg the reader
to be patient and keep the question unanswered for a while?
Turning now to the chief, the matter seems–prima facie–simpler
than in the previous case. Certainly he is not, in any sense, the
owner of either the sende or the Zande as the local language
indicates. This was clear to my mind. But then, which French word
to use? I finally decided in favour of “master” (maître).
Such choice was motivated by a fundamental wish, i.e. to find a
single word in French (as in paZande where one finds ira) which
could apply to both the chief and his subject. If I had accepted not to
take that wish of linguistic homogeneity into consideration, the
problem would have been easily solved, by using “lord” for the chief
and “owner” for the commoner. But I had the feeling that by doing
so I was introducing in my description the distinction between public
and private law, so familar to me through my legal education, but
totally absent from the Zande mind. The thing would perhaps have
been easier if I had been trained in the common law where that
fundamental distinction has long been absent from the doctrinal
sphere. But I was communicating with continental lawyers educated
differently and for which the split between public and private was
fundamental in the legal discourse. “Maître” had the advantage that
it was still used (yet only once) in the French or Belgian Civil Code
when speaking of the liability of masters for the wrongful acts of
their servants (art. 1384, al. 5) and (this time, twice) when referring
to property which is vacant or “without master” (art. 539 and 713).
Maître could thus apply to both persons and things, as did ira when
concerning either the sende–a thing–or the Zande–a person. This for
the public law side. As for the private law one, didn’t popular
wisdom say that “charbonnier est maître chez soi” (literally “a
coalman is the master in his own house,” or, in accordance with the
English idiom “a man’s house is his castle”)?
11. A.N. Allott, Language and Property: A Universal Vocabulary for the
Analysis and Description of Proprietary Relationships, 11 AFRICAN LANGUAGE
STUDIES 12, 20 (1970).
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Fifty years later, I admit that all this seems (or should I write is?)
amateurish. Had I been better informed of the existing
anthropological literature about what I had to study, I would also
have realized that in many African societies–as in the case of the
Zande with ira–a single word is used to characterize the most
extensive powers of a person on land. 12 But, the reader knows, from
the introduction to this paper, in which circumstances and with
which kind of training (or should I write non-training?) I marched
into the heart of darkness; my total ignorance of methodology,
substance and form insofar as what I had to study is obvious. What
is perhaps funnier is that the publication of the results of my research
led to an invitation to the Second International African Seminar
organized by the International African Institute in Kinshasa (then
Léopoldville), where I spoke about the problems resulting from the
introduction of new ways of using land among the Zande and that
two years later, on the basis of these two papers, I was asked to open
and occupy the chair of African customary law at the Lovanium
University also in Kinshasa. From then on, an incredible number of
persons strongly believed (and still do) that I was a legal
anthropologist. How strange!
All along that long road into the kingdom of academe which is
still mine nearly half a century later, I have met many brethren–
sometimes close friends–who were treading along the
same
path. But, be
it K. Bentsi-Enchill in 1965, 13
A. Allott in 1970, 14 H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo in 1974, 15

12. Daniel Biebuyck, supra note 8, at 3-5. He provides examples borrowed
from the Barotse in Zambia, the Lo Wiili, the Nsaw in Cameroon, and the Nyanga
in the Congo. Be it the word mung’a, so, KEr, or mine–and one cannot but be
struck by the likeness with the ira of the Zande–one single word indicates the most
extensive powers a person with a specific status may have on a specific sort of
land.
13. K. Bentsi-Enchill, Do African Systems of Land Tenure Require a Special
Terminology?, in AFRICAN LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 265-290 (Gordon R.
Woodman & A. O. Obilade eds., Dartmouth 1995).
14. Allott, supra note 11.
15. H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, Property Theory and Land Use Analysis, in
AFRICAN LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 291-305 (Gordon R. Woodman & A. O.
Obilade eds., Dartmouth 1995).
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G. McCormack in 1983 16 and T.W. Bennett in 1985 17 –only to
mention a fewnone of them were of much help insofar as I was and
still am concerned about the extraordinary (from an American or
European point of view) concept of a man-earth or person-thing
entity. But the most influential and seminal for me was P.
Bohannan, whom I met at length in the International African
Institute Seminar on land tenure that I was invited to in Kinshasa, as
I mentioned earlier in this paper. In his presentation, Bohannan
wrote:
It is . . . probable that no single topic concerning Africa has
produced so large a poor literature . . . The ignorance derives
less from want of ‘facts’ than what we do not know what to
do with these ‘facts’ or how to interpret them. 18
His words were echoed after a week of discussions at the
International African Institute Seminar when its organizer, Daniel
Biebuyck wrote, under the title Problems of Analysis and
Terminology:
The comparative study of the innumerable works devoted to
these problems [those of land tenure] reveals, as it was
underscored in the Seminar, the big disparity of approaches
and the inadequacy of the corresponding terminology, the
existence of a serie of untrue statements and the absence of a
true theory in that field. 19
Twenty-five years later, Bennett considered–a judgment to which
I still subscribe today–that it was “disheartening to find that little
progress seems to have been made” 20 on that topic.

16. G. McCormack, Problems in the Description of African Systems of
Landholding, in AFRICAN LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 321-334 (Gordon R.
Woodman & A. O. Obilade eds., Dartmouth 1995).
17. T.W. Bennett, Terminology and Land Tenure in Customary Law: An
Exercicse in Linguistic Theory, in AFRICAN LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 335-349
(Gordon R. Woodman & A. O. Obilade eds., Dartmouth 1995).
18. P. Bohannan, ‘Land’, ‘Tenure’ and Land-Tenure, in AFRICAN AGRARIAN
SYSTEMS 101 (Daniel Biebuyck ed., International African Institute 1963).
19. Author’s translation from the French. Daniel Biebuyck, Problems of
Analysis and Terminology, in AFRICAN AGRARIAN SYSTEMS 1-19, n. 2 (Daniel
Biebuyck ed., International African Institute 1963).
20. Bennett, supra note 17, at 335.
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CONCLUSION
(IF I AM STILL ABLE TO ESCAPE SELF-DERISION)
In the course of the fifty years which followed my escapade in
the Zande country, the deeper and wider I went into comparing laws,
the more I was inclined to realize how true Karl Llewellyn was when
he wrote:
Legal usage of technical words has sinned, and does still, in
two respects; it is involved in ambiguity of two kinds:
multiple senses of the same term, and terms too broad to be
precise in application to the details of single disputes. First,
it does not use terms in single senses, but uses the same term
in several senses; and in everal senses, indiscriminately,
without awareness. This invites confusion, it makes bad
logic almost inevitable, it makes clear statement of
clear thought difficult, it makes clear thought itself
improbable. No logician worth his salt would stand for it; no
scientist would stand for it. 21
I do not claim, in any way, to be considered as a logician or a
scientist, but being forced into communication by my craft, I cannot
but be struck by the fundamental truth emanating from these words
first uttered when I had still two years to go before being conceived.
In this instance, when the Zande speak of ira or we speak of
ownership, we all use abstract terms reflecting concepts built in our
minds, and probably more clearly formulated in the Zande country
where people live the law as a constant communal process than in
our countries where they are the product of self-proclaimed
sophisticated minds arguing, as in Byzantium, about the sex of
angels in a language that even ordinary lawyers are at pains to
understand. Lawyers and perhaps more evidently legal scholars–a
group to which I belong so that everything I write about it can
obviously refer to me–have not yet had the capacity or the courage to
develop a language which would at least try to be understandable by
all lawyers of good will. Also, no one has decided to take the time
and courage needed for a possible systematic and rigorous
application of the fundamental concepts defined by W.N. Hohfeld to
African land tenure, in spite of the eloquent plea made in favour of it

21. K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 84 (Oceana 1978).
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by E.A. Hoebel in his Law of Primitive Man, 22 which he concludes
by another quotation of his accomplice in the study of the Cheyenne,
Karl Llewellyn: “And thinking thus, in nicer terms, with nicer tools
of thought, you pull the issue in clarity . . . unambiguously, because
your terms are not ambiguous.” 23 But these voices of scholars of
first magnitude in legal anthropology were clamantes in deserto.
Everything went on as if there was a definite advantage to keep the
law ambiguous and the comparison between laws foggy.
And yet on the rich material we currently have, from the factual
point of view through more numerous and elaborate legal
anthropological fieldwork, through fundmental theoretical legal
research and also, in some instances, through a combination of both,
it should have been possible to go beyond–and even, if one looks at
my limited and shaky contribution on Zande law, far beyond–what
has been common knowledge among africanists for more than a
quarter of a century.
I have had some occasions to plead in favour of such joint efforts
involving scholars in the field of law and linguistics. To no avail,
the most reluctant being the lawyers. For sure, their theoretical
contribution seems more advanced than the development of research
in African concepts about what “order” may mean in society. Social
anthropology has made tremendous progresses in the analysis of
African ways of thinking; but they seem to have focused on the
background, both factual and intellectual, which subsumes what we
could possibly call “order” or “law.” The task is complicated by the
fact that many among us–including myself–have serious doubts as to
the existence in pre-colonial African minds of a distinct mental
category isolating what we consider as “legal” from the rest of the
seamless web which holds those societies together. But, at least, the
challenge ought to be met. And do not ask me why I did not take it
up. The accused can’t be forced into admitting his own guilt.
Being currently, in the twilight of my life, I am still in the Heart
of Darkness about what I consider to be a possible science of laws at
large. 24
22. E.A. HOEBEL, LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN 46-53 (Harvard University Press
1954).
23. LLEWELLYN, supra note 21, at 88.
24. I come back to this issue of a general formulation of legal concepts in Les
nouvelles ambitions de la science du juriste: Une langue générale de
spécialisation en droit est-elle une utopie ?, forthcoming, in a volume edited by R.
Sacco, to be published by the Accademia nazionale dei Lincei in Rome.

